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The non-identity problem, in a nutshell, is that some actions seem morally 
wrong even though, by affecting future people’s identities, they are worse 
for nobody.1 I will give two well-known examples of such actions, as 
described by David Boonin.2 First: 
 
Wilma. Wilma has decided to have a baby. She goes to her doctor for a checkup 
and the doctor tells her that…as things now stand, if she conceives, her child will 
have a disability…that clearly has a substantially negative impact on a person’s 
quality of life…[but is not] so serious as to render the child’s life worse than no life 
at all…[But] Wilma can prevent this from happening. If she takes a tiny pill once a 
day for two months before conceiving, her child will be perfectly healthy. The pill 
is easy to take, has no side effects, and will be paid for by her health 
insurance…Wilma decides that having to take a pill once a day for two months 
before conceiving is a bit too inconvenient and so chooses to throw the pills away 




1 The problem was first brought to the attention of philosophers by Derek Parfit in his 
“On Doing the Best for Our Children,” in Michael D. Bayles, ed., Ethics and Population 
(Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1976), pp. 100-115, and further developed in his 
Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
2 David Boonin, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). Boonin’s cases are based on some of Parfit’s own. I 
use Boonin’s descriptions rather than Parfit’s or my own, as Boonin’s are beautifully 
succinct and evocative. 
3 Boonin, ibid., 2. 
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Wilma’s action seems morally wrong. But how can it be? It is not, after all, 
any worse for her child. Had Wilma taken the pills, the particular 
individual who is now her child would not have existed at all. Instead, a 
numerically different individual would have existed in her place, since a 
different sperm-egg combination would have been involved in the 
conception. Wilma’s conceiving immediately, rather than her taking the 
pills, is not worse for her child, since it was a condition of this particular 
individual’s (worthwhile) existence. 
Here is the second example: 
 
The Risky Policy. A wealthy society is running out of the fossil fuels that have made 
its affluence possible, and is choosing between two sources of energy to replace 
them. One option is a source of energy that would enable its current citizens to 
continue to enjoy a high standard of living and which would have no negative 
impact on future generations. The second option is a source of energy that would 
enable its current citizens to enjoy a slightly higher standard of living but which 
would generate a significant amount of toxic waste. The waste could be safely 
buried for a long period of time, but it is known that after five hundred years, the 
waste would leak out and that of the millions of people who would be exposed to 
it, tens of thousands would be killed as a result. [Call] the first option…the safe 
policy. [Call] the second option…the risky policy…Knowing that the risky policy 
will generate toxic waste that will eventually leak and kill tens of thousands of 
innocent people in the future, the current members of the wealthy society 
nonetheless decide to select that option because doing so will enable them to enjoy 
a slightly higher quality of life. As a result of their choice, the toxic waste that they 
create and bury leaks out five hundred years later and kills tens of thousands of 
innocent people.4 
 
The action of the Wealthy People (WP) seems morally wrong. But how can 
it be? It is not, after all, any worse for those prematurely killed as a result 
of the toxic waste, since it is a condition of their (worthwhile) existence. 
Why is it a condition of their existence? Boonin explains this nicely as 
follows: 
 
The choice of one energy source over the other…will…have an impact on where 
people decide to work, play, and live, all of which will have an impact on who 
they meet and when they meet them, which will in turn have an impact on who 
they decide to have children with, on whether they decide to have any children at 
all, and so on…Over time, the effects of these subtle differences will be enough to 
generate two entirely distinct sets of people: the set of people who will exist five 
hundred years from now if the safe policy is selected, and the completely different 
 
4 Boonin, ibid., 5. 
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set of people who will exist five hundred years from now if the risky policy is 
selected.5 
 
Many different responses have been given to the non-identity problem. 
The most popular response has been to try to explain how these actions 
can be wrong even if they are worse for nobody. It has been argued, for 
example, that they are wrong because they 
 
(i) harm people without being worse for them6,  
(ii) wrong people, violate their rights, or exploit them, without 
harming or being worse for them7,  
(iii) bring about more pain than pleasure.8  
 
Each of these explanations faces serious and well-documented 
difficulties.9 
My goal in this paper is to further develop and defend a lesser known 
solution to the problem, one according to which when such actions are 
 
5 Boonin, ibid., 6. 
6 See, for example, Seana Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the 
Significance of Harm,” Legal Theory, V, 2 (1999): 117–48; Elizabeth Harman, “Harming 
as Causing Harm”, in Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman, eds., Harming 
Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, (New York: Springer, 
2009), pp. 137–54; Molly Gardner, “A Harm-Based Solution to the Non-Identity 
Problem,” Ergo, II, 17 (2015): 427-444. 
7 See Gregory Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, XI, 2 (1982): 93–112; Doran Smolkin, “Toward a Rights-Based Solution to the 
Non-Identity Problem,” Journal of Social Philosophy, XXX, 1 (1999): 194–208; Rivka 
Weinberg, “Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem,” Philosophical 
Studies, CXXXVII, 1 (2008): 3–18; David Velleman, “Persons in Prospect,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, XXXVI, 3 (2008): 221-322. 
8 For further discussion of (iii), see Parfit, Reasons and Persons, op. cit. 
9 For criticism of (i), see especially Matthew Hanser, “Harming and Procreating,” in 
Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman, eds., Harming Future Persons: Ethics, 
Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 179-199; Judith 
Thomson, “More on the Metaphysics of Harm,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, LXXXII, 2 (2010): 438-458; and Ben Bradley, “Doing Away with 
Harm,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXV, 2 (2012): 390–412. For 
criticism of (ii), see especially Parfit, ibid. The best-known and most serious criticism 
of (iii) is that it gives rise to what Parfit, ibid., dubs the repugnant conclusion. 
 4 
wrong, it is not because of what they do or produce at all, but rather just 
because of why they were performed.10 In particular, I will argue that  
 
such actions are wrong just when and because they result from, or 
reflect in those who have performed them, a morally dubious character 
trait. 
 
Following Boonin, I will refer to this as the defective character solution 
(DCS).11 
The plan for the paper is as follows: I will start by motivating DCS 
(section I). I will then describe what I consider to be the best candidates for 
the morally dubious traits that, on DCS, explain the moral wrongness of 
the actions in non-identity cases (section II). I will then respond to two 
important objections to DCS (sections III and IV). Finally, I will explain 
what I regard as the second-best solution to the non-identity problem, a 
view on which the actions in these cases are not morally wrong (section 
V). 
 
I. MOTIVATING DCS 
 
According to DCS, the actions in non-identity cases are morally wrong, 
not because of what they do or produce, but just when and because they 
result from or reflect a morally dubious character trait in those who have 
performed them. To see the appeal of DCS, consider some variations of 
the non-identity cases where, due to giant flukes, the predicted outcomes 
do not occur (Wilma’s child is not born disabled, and there is no toxic 
leak). In these variations, the actions of Wilma and WP still seem morally 
wrong or condemnable, but it is hard to see how they could be wrong 
 
10 Others who have defended this sort of solution include Valentina Urbanek, The 
Non-Identity Problem, Dissertation MIT (2010); David Wasserman “The Nonidentity 
Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective Parents,” Ethics, CXVI, 1 
(2005): 132–52; and Mianna Lotz, “Rethinking Procreation: Why it Matters Why We 
Have Children,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, XXVIII, 2 (2011): 105–21. 
11 Boonin, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People, op. cit., 184. 
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because of what they do or produce—after all, the relevant future 
individuals are completely fine. How, then, are we able to explain their 
wrongness? A natural thought is that we might be able to do so by appeal 
to something that remains fixed in both the original cases and the 
variations: why the actions were performed. Here, we have, I think, a 
powerful motivation for DCS. 
It might be suggested that certain rivals of DCS—namely, deontological 
accounts—also have the resources to explain why the actions in the 
variations are wrong. This is because, while these actions are not worse for 
anyone and so harm nobody, they might nonetheless wrong the relevant 
future people or breach their rights in some way.12 Consider, by analogy, a 
case where you fail to fasten your child’s safety belt, but no accident 
occurs. Here, it might be said, you have acted wrongly because you 
wronged your child in some way or breached their rights, even though 
your child was in no way made worse off or harmed. 
But consider a further kind of case, where Wilma attempts to conceive 
now rather than wait, but a different kind of fluke occurs, preventing 
conception altogether. Intuitively, what Wilma does in this further case is 
still morally wrong or condemnable.13 Indeed, it seems equally wrong as 
in the earlier cases. But in this further case, there is no future person at all 
who might count as wronged by her action. If what she does here is 
equally wrong as what she does in the earlier cases, then its wrongness in 
those earlier cases is not plausibly due to its harming or wronging some 
future individual. It is more plausible to say that it is due to something 
that remains fixed in all three cases: why the actions were performed. 
 
12 According to Velleman, “Persons in Prospect,” op. cit., for example, the actions in 
non-identity cases are wrong because they breach future people’s rights “to be born 
into good enough circumstances” (275) or “to have been created with due 
consideration for one’s humanity” (276). He writes: “A child to whom we give a 
lesser initial provision will have been wronged by our lack of due concern for human 
life in creating him—our lack of concern for human life itself, albeit in his case” (276). 
13 Note that her morally wrong action here is one, not of conceiving (for there is no 
conception), but of trying to conceive. Was her wrong action in the earlier cases the 
same—namely, one of trying to conceive, rather than actually conceiving? For the 
purposes of this paper, I am happy to describe it in either of these terms. 
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There is a further thing to say in response to the suggestion that the 
actions in the variations might be wrong because they wrong those whom 
they create. Even if the people created exist in a wronged state, there is 
reason to think that they are not wronged by these acts of creation. 
Consider the following analogy. Suppose you create somebody who is in a 
tickled state (when the only alternatives are creating a different individual 
or nobody at all). It is implausible to say that by creating this person, you 
have tickled them. The same goes, it seems to me, for wronging a person. 
Just as you cannot tickle somebody by creating them in a tickled state, you 
cannot wrong somebody by creating them in a wronged state (again, on 
the assumption that the alternative was not to create them at all).14 
 
II. THE MORALLY DUBIOUS TRAITS 
 
What morally dubious traits of Wilma and WP could be explaining why 
their actions are wrong? There are, I think, several possibilities. To see one 
possibility, consider that, though the actions of Wilma and WP are not 
worse for anybody, and so harm nobody, Wilma and WP might not realise 
this, and indeed might believe that their actions would harm the relevant 
future people. How might they believe this? One way is if they hold the 
mistaken view that the relevant future people are in some sense ‘waiting 
in the wings’, or fixed in their identities prior to conception. They might 
hold this view, for example, if they do not realise that changing the time of 
conception changes the sperm-egg combinations that give rise to future 
people. Alternatively, they might hold this view if they do not realise that 
changes in sperm-egg combinations have a bearing on identity. 
 
14 For a similar idea, see Hanser, “Harming and Procreating,” op. cit., 195. Hanser 
writes, of a case like that of Wilma, “The parents’ creating their child rather than 
doing something else does not explain why their child has one sort of life or existence 
rather than another…Their creating him rather than doing something else explains 
why he is alive rather than not alive, existent rather than nonexistent. The bare 
property of being alive, or of existing, however, does not have both good and bad 
“elements””. 
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Another way that Wilma and WP might believe that their actions 
would harm the relevant future people is if they do not realise that 
harming someone requires making that person worse off in some respect 
than they would otherwise have been. If they do not realise this, then they 
might believe that their actions would harm the relevant future people 
even if they understand that conception time affects sperm-egg 
combination, and sperm-egg combination affects identity.  
If Wilma and WP believe that their actions would harm the relevant 
future people, then their actions might be wrong in virtue of expressing or 
reflecting in Wilma and WP a morally dubious willingness to harm others 
for the sake of relatively minor or trivial gains for themselves. 
Turn now to the second possibility. Wilma and WP might not have even 
considered whether their actions would harm the relevant future people. Though 
Wilma has been told that her child would have a disability, and WP have 
been told that there would be a toxic leak, it might not have occurred to 
them that these things could harm the future people in question. This is 
because they might be too caught up in their own affairs or too focused on 
possible gains for themselves. In this case, their moral flaw would be, not 
a willingness to harm others for the sake of relatively minor or trivial 
gains for themselves, but a simple failure to think of others in the first 
place. It might be that if they were disposed to think more about others—
and in particular of the impacts of their actions on others’ well-being—
they would form the belief (albeit mistaken) that their actions would harm 
the relevant future people, and on this basis refrain from performing the 
actions in question. Here, their actions would be wrong in virtue of 
expressing their self-absorption. 
Turn now to the third possibility. Suppose these agents 
 
(1) understand that their choice of action will affect the identities of 
relevant future people, and so that their proposed action (for 
example, conceiving now, enacting the risky policy, and so on) 
would not harm future individuals, and  
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(2) perform these actions only because of this understanding (that is, 
without it, they would not perform these actions, out of a concern 
for the relevant future individuals).  
 
Call these amended agents Wilma* and WP*. Their actions still seem 
wrong. But what could their morally dubious traits be?15 The remainder of 
this section will be devoted to answering this question. 
Consider, first, Wilma*. Suppose she is at the doctor’s, where a trainee 
who happens to have studied population ethics is observing. Their 
conversation goes like this: 
 
Doctor:  Wilma, I’m sorry to tell you that if you conceive now, your 
child will have a serious disability. 
Wilma*:  Oh no, doctor, that’s terrible news! 
Doctor:  Don’t worry. If you take these pills every day for two months, 
and then conceive, your child will be born completely 
healthy. 
Wilma*:  That’s a relief! I have a very busy next two months and it will 
be inconvenient to take these pills, but of course I’m happy to 
take them to improve my child’s life. 
Trainee:  I’m sorry to interrupt, but I feel I should point out that if you 
wait two months, this would change the identity of your 
child. A different sperm-egg combination would be involved 
in the conception. So, waiting would not actually be better for 
your child (at least not in the sense that matters). Similarly, 
conceiving now would not be worse for the individual you 
give birth to. In fact, it is this individual’s only chance of 
existing at all. 
Wilma*:  Gosh, how interesting. Of course, you’re right. What fabulous 
news! I’ve no need to take the pills. I’ll conceive immediately. 
 
15 Boonin believes that this is a question DCS cannot answer. See Boonin, The Non-
Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People, op. cit., 185-88. 
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There is, it seems to me, still something disturbing about Wilma*, even 
though she is neither self-absorbed nor prepared to do what would be 
worse for her child for the sake of trivial gains for herself. What is 
disturbing about her? Wilma*, it seems, is emotionally or affectively cold in a 
certain way. A normal person in her situation would simply mind the 
thought of their child’s having a serious disability—that is, they would 
have a negative emotional reaction (including some unpleasant feelings) to this 
thought—even after hearing and understanding what the trainee doctor 
had said. At the very least, they would be aware, if only implicitly, that 
their child’s having such a disability would be significantly worse for 
them—say, by causing them to feel some sadness or upset each day that 
they would not otherwise feel, at witnessing the difficulties faced by their 
child. For this reason, they would not hesitate to wait two months, despite 
the inconvenience of this. 
Suppose Wilma* is indeed cold in this way. Why is such coldness 
disturbing, rather than merely abnormal or unusual? The answer, I want 
to suggest, is that such coldness interferes with a person’s ability to experience 
some of the best things in life—most notably, deep and close personal 
relationships, and appreciation of great works of art.16 To fully experience these 
things, one needs to have a kind or depth of emotionality that Wilma* (on 
my supposition) lacks. Someone who does not feel sad at the thought of 
their child’s having a serious disability (even where this disability is a 
condition of this child’s very existence) is not somebody who is going to 
be able to have the full range of beneficial emotional responses to things. 
 
16 I assume here the existence of certain objective personal goods—that is, things that 
are good for us, or that contribute to our well-being, whether we want them or not. 
This, of course, is a controversial assumption, and I’ve not space to defend it here. I 
will note only that the goods I am appealing to—personal relationships and 
appreciation of great works—are among the least controversial such goods in the 
literature. Most objective list theorists are happy to include them, or similar items, on 
their lists of goods. For more on objective theories, see Guy Fletcher, “A Fresh Start 
for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being,” Utilitas, XXV, 2 (2013): 206-220. 
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Wilma* is disturbing, in other words, because we implicitly realise that 
she is someone who, in virtue of her coldness, is cut off from the full range 
of beneficial human experiences. Part of our concern here is for her (or for 
her level of well-being). But part of it seems also to be that she reminds us 
of the possibility of a world in which people more generally are colder or less 
emotional than they are in the actual world right now, and so a world in which 
people’s lives are much less valuable for them than they are in reality. This is 
disturbing because it reminds us of the contingency—and indeed the 
fragility—of much that is valuable in our world. It reminds us not only 
that things might be otherwise, but that they might yet come to be 
otherwise, a terrifying prospect. 
Now, why might Wilma* be, not simply disturbing, but morally so? It is, 
I want now to suggest, because a person’s emotional responses—and 
indeed their emotional responsiveness more generally—can be infectious or 
catching. The ways that people feel about things are constantly forming 
and reforming, a process that is heavily influenced by their perceptions of 
the feelings of others. In the psychological literature, this phenomenon is 
known as emotional contagion.17 We are especially influenced by the 
emotions of our immediate peers, whether family, friends, or colleagues, 
and in particular those who seem to us most significant or powerful 
within these groups. Importantly for my purposes, this process takes place 
mostly unconsciously.18 
Wilma*, then, might be morally dubious in virtue of having a tendency, 
through her words, deeds, or even mannerisms, to lead others to become 
colder themselves, thereby harming them (by interferring with their 
ability to experience some of the best things in life). A perfect example is 
 
17 See especially Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson, 
“Emotional Contagion,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, II, 3 (1993): 96–99. 
For related sociological literature, see Randall Collin, “Stratification, Emotional 
Energy, and the Transient Emotions,” in T. David Kemper, ed., Research Agendas in the 
Sociology of Emotions (State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 27-57; and David 
R. Heise and J. O’Brien, “Emotion Expression in Groups”, in Michael Lewis and 
Jeannette M. Haviland, Handbook of Emotions (New York: Guilford, 1993), pp. 489-497. 
18 Hatfield et al, ibid. 
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her decision to conceive now rather than wait. This decision, by revealing 
her to not feel sad about her child’s having a serious disability, might 
influence others whom she encounters to become less emotional when 
they contemplate similar outcomes. Alternatively, it might make a small 
contribution to a gradual normalisation in society of such unemotionality, 
a sense that such unemotionality or coldness is neither abnormal nor 
harmful to its subject. This in turn could lead to others becoming colder, 
or, in the case of those who are already cold, to their failing to recover or 
achieve warmth. 
It might be objected: but Wilma* might not even realise she is cold in a 
way that interferes with her ability to experience some of the best things in 
life. Alternatively, she might not realise that her words and deeds have a 
tendency to lead others to become colder themselves. If either of these 
things is true, then she cannot rightly be considered morally dubious even 
if she has a tendency to harm others in this way. 
I disagree. Even if Wilma* does not realise these things, it might be that 
she should realise them. She might be, for example, ‘in denial’ about her 
unemotionality or its harmfulness to herself and (potentially) to others, 
perhaps out of an unconscious recognition of the pain that acknowledging 
these things might cause her, or the burdens she would thereby acquire 
(burdens to, for example, curtail her behaviour, feign warmth, or even 
possibly quarantine herself from others in certain contexts).19 Even if she is 
not in some sense in denial, she might nonetheless be smart enough that 
she should realise these things and amend her behaviour accordingly.20 
But perhaps Wilma* is not cold. She might feel sad indeed at the 
thought of her child’s having such a disability, yet conceives now out of 
hard-headedness. She thinks to herself: 
 
 
19 Or perhaps someone who is cold like Wilma* should simply be upfront about her 
lack of emotion, and her concern that it might reduce her own well-being or that of 
others. 
20 Note that if Wilma* is entirely lacking in emotion (or even perhaps in certain ways 
seriously bereft of it) she might not count as morally evaluable at all. Some 
emotionality, arguably, is needed for this. 
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My feelings of sadness here are inappropriate or ill-fitting. They do not 
reflect the normative reality of my situation—namely, that conceiving 
now would be in no way worse for my child. I have no reason to have 
such feelings. Given this, I should attach them no weight or 
significance. I should ignore or even oppose them. 
 
Call this woman Wilma**. Might Wilma** still be morally disturbing? I 
think so. Suppose she is right that her feelings of sadness are 
inappropriate or ill-fitting.21 Still, the fact that she is disposed to feel them 
entails that it is hugely imprudent for her to conceive now rather than 
wait. She is choosing a course that will be considerably worse, on balance, 
for herself, and better for no one.  
It might be suggested that Wilma** might think that choosing this 
course could help her to ‘harden up’ emotionally, and so to experience 
such ill-fitting feelings less often. But if this is true, then she is even less 
prudent, for she is trying to rid herself of (or at least diminish) what is a 
condition of many of the best things in her life.  
If Wilma** is imprudent in either or both of these ways, then she is, I 
believe, like the version of Wilma* who is emotionally cold, a kind of 
threat to others, for her words and deeds might incline some others to 
become less emotional themselves, or to make choices that are worse for 
them and better for no one (by leading to outcomes where they often feel 
sad). 
Incidentally, it seems doubtful that Wilma** is right that her feelings of 
sadness are inappropriate or ill-fitting. While her conceiving now rather than 
later would not be worse for her child, if she does conceive now, then her 
child’s disability will be worse for it. Her child will be worse off living with 
this disability than it would be were it to somehow exist without it. 
Wilma**’s feelings of sadness (whether she realises it or not) are almost 
certainly at the thought of her child’s having this disability as opposed to 
 
21 In a moment I will question this assumption. 
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this very same individual’s existing without this disability.22 Certainly, if she 
were to conceive now, then the feelings of sadness she would experience 
during her time as a parent would be at the thought of her child’s having 
this disability as opposed to this very same individual’s existing without this 
disability.23 
Turn now to WP*. Imagine the following conversation taking place 
between several members of the wealthy society: 
 
Alex:  We should enact the safe policy. We must take into account the 
interests of these future people. Our being slightly better off now 
is not worth their suffering in this way. 
Bella:  I totally agree. 
Caleb:  I’m sorry to interrupt, but I’ve studied population ethics. Do 
you realise that our choice of policy here will affect the identities 
of these future people? Given this, enacting the risky policy 
would not be worse for any of these future people. On the 
contrary, it is their only chance of existing. 
Alex:  Gosh, how interesting. Of course, you’re right. What fabulous 
news! I now think we should enact the risky policy. This would 
enable us to be better off at no one’s expense. 
Caleb:  My thoughts precisely. 
Bella:  Hold on, you two! Don’t you just mind the thought of the future 
containing all this suffering, of this being the future course of the 
world? Isn’t this thought unpleasant to you? Doesn’t it make 
you feel sad or upset? 
Alex:  Not at all. 
Caleb: Me neither. 
 
22 It is hard to imagine what it would even be for one to feel sad right now at the 
thought of one’s conceiving now and having a disabled child as compared with one’s 
waiting two months and then having a healthy child. 
23 Note that, if what I’ve said here is right, this adds a further dimension to my worry 
about Wilma*’s coldness. It means that she is not responding in a way that is fitting, 
or called for by the normative reality of her situation. This might constitute a further 
respect in which she is disturbing (even if not morally so). 
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Again, there seems something disturbing here about Alex and Caleb. As 
Bella realises, they seem to be cold in a certain way. Someone who is 
emotionally as one needs to be in order to fully experience the best things in life 
would, as a matter of fact, feel sad at the thought of future people suffering in 
these ways, even if they recognised that this suffering was, in the relevant 
circumstances, a necessary condition of these individuals’ existing at all. The 
responses of Alex and Caleb suggest that they cannot fully experience 
these best things in life. And they are morally disturbing because they 
seem cavalier here, liable to speak or act in ways that might have a 
tendency to lead some others in society to come to feel colder—say, their 
own children, friends, colleagues, and so on. Alex and Caleb should know 
better. 
But suppose Alex and Caleb respond to Bella’s challenge in a different 
way. They say: 
 
Yes, of course the thought of all this suffering in future times makes us 
feel sad. But it should not do so. Such feelings are ill-fitting. There is no 
reason to have them. 
 
Call members of the wealthy society who respond this way to Bella’s 
challenge, WP**. Might WP** still be morally dubious? I think so. Whether 
or not such feelings of sadness are ill-fitting24, they make life significantly 
worse for those who feel them. Alex and Caleb should realise that they 
themselves would be better off if the safe policy were enacted, and so this 
future suffering was not predicted to occur. They are morally dubious 
because, like Wilma**, their words and deeds might lead to others 
becoming less emotional themselves or making choices that are worse for 
them and better for no one. And if Alex and Caleb are in addition hoping, 
by advocating the risky policy, to themselves ‘harden up’, then they pose 
an even greater threat to others who might be influenced by them. 
 
24 And, as I suggested above, this is disputable. 
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I conclude that Wilma* and WP* might be morally dubious in virtue of 
being cold or imprudent in ways that have a tendency to spread to others, 
and so harm other people. This might account for the wrongness of their 
actions. 
 
III. THE ‘NO REASONS’ OBJECTION 
 
I want now to consider two important objections to DCS. The first 
objection is that, intuitively, the wrongness of these actions provides 
Wilma and WP with reasons not to perform these actions, and forward-
looking reasons at that—that is, reasons having to do precisely with what 
these actions would do or produce. But DCS cannot account for this, as it 
locates the wrongness of these actions in what they say about Wilma and 
WP. This relation could not constitute a reason (or at any rate, not the 
right kind of reason). By contrast, the rival explanations of these actions’ 
wrongness mentioned in the introduction face no such worry. Unlike 
DCS, they can say that these agents have reasons not to perform these 
actions stemming from what these actions do or produce—for example, 
from their harming future beings, wronging future beings, or bringing 
about more pain than pleasure. 
The first thing to say in response to this objection is that DCS can 
account for why at least many of the agents in non-identity cases have 
forward-looking reasons not to perform the actions in question. It can do 
so because, as I’ve been arguing, their performing these actions might be 
worse for some existing people. Wilma* and WP* (including Wilma** and 
WP**) might influence some others to become colder or less prudent in 
various ways. As for Wilma and WP, they might influence some others to 
come to have less regard for other people, which (for obvious reasons) 
could be worse in various ways for these latter people. 
It might be objected that even if this is true, the reasons in question 
would not stem from the wrongness of the actions per se. But this is not so. 
If DCS is true, then there would be a clear sense in which these reasons are 
connected with these actions’ wrongness. On DCS, their wrongness 
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consists in the fact that these agents threaten harm to others. As for the 
forward-looking reasons they have not to perform these actions, these are 
reasons to avoid precisely these harms. 
Indeed, it might be thought that DCS here has an advantage over the 
rival explanations of these actions’ wrongness, for only DCS links the 
reasons these agents have not to perform these actions to these actions 
being worse for certain beings. Why is this an advantage? It is because an 
action’s being worse for someone is more clearly a reason not to perform it 
than is its, say, harming, wronging, or causing more pain than pleasure, 
without being worse for anyone. 
It might be objected that this response is inadequate, since it is 
important that the reasons these agents have to avoid the actions in 
question be even more strongly related to their wrongness. In particular, it 
is necessary that their being wrong is sufficient for (or a guarantee of) the 
existence of such reasons.  
But I do not see why this is so. What seems intuitive here (to me, at 
least) is just that in such cases there are generally forward-looking reasons 
not to perform such actions. That, on DCS, there are some unusual cases in 
which such reasons do not exist—that is, cases where these actions 
happen not to influence anybody to become colder, less prudent, and so 
on—does not seem to me to be a problem for DCS. Indeed, when we 
consider such cases, it seems to me intuitive that there are no such reasons 
in them. Suppose, for example, that Wilma* lives a fairly solitary 
existence, and so happens through good fortune not to influence anyone to 
become any colder themselves. Furthermore, had she waited to conceive, 
this would, as a matter of fact, not have led her to become any less cold 
herself. In such a case, Wilma* might still, on DCS, be morally dubious, 
and her action wrong (in virtue of reflecting her dubiousness), but it does 
not seem plausible to me that she in fact had a reason to wait.25 
 
 
25 I admit that it might be hard, in such hypotheticals, to have clear intuitions. But 
this, it seems, is a point in my favour, for it would mean that it is harder also to have 
clear intuitions that Wilma* has a reason. 
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IV. THE ‘FOUNDING INTUITION’ OBJECTION 
 
The non-identity problem is founded on the fact that so many people find 
intuitive the following principle: 
 
WRONGNESS. An action is morally wrong only if it is worse for 
somebody.26 
 
If DCS is right, however—or indeed, if any of the other explanations 
mentioned in the introduction of why the actions in such cases are morally 
wrong is right—then WRONGNESS is false. DCS, then, like these other 
explanations, owes us an account of why so many people find WRONGNESS 
intuitive when it is in fact false. The difficulty of providing such an account 
is the second objection to DCS I want to consider. 
Why do so many people find WRONGNESS intuitive? There are, I 
think, two main reasons. The first is that, since DCS is true, the vast 
majority of actions that are morally wrong are worse for some beings. As 
I’ve been arguing, the actions in non-identity cases that are morally wrong 
reveal the agent in question to be in some way dangerous or threatening 
to others. Actions that reveal or express such a trait will naturally be, in 
many cases, in fact worse for certain others. 
As I’ve said, there are exceptions, unusual cases in which an action 
might express or reflect the agent’s having a tendency to perform actions 
that are worse for others, but not in fact be worse for anyone. But a 
proponent of DCS can say that the connection here is strong enough that it 
might be part of the explanation for why people find WRONGNESS 
intuitive. People are here picking up on this general truth, and mistaking 
it for a hard and fast rule. 
 
26 Parfit calls such a principle the Narrow Deontic (Person-Affecting) Principle in his 
“Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, XLV, 2 (2017): 118-157. 
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The second reason for which some people might find WRONGNESS 
intuitive when it is in fact false is that there is a related principle that is 
true, namely: 
 
REASONS. One has a reason not to perform an action only if it is worse 
for somebody. 
 
Perhaps some people who find WRONGNESS intuitive are picking up 
instead on the truth of REASONS. This could easily be so given that many 
people seem to assume—wrongly, as I’ve been arguing—that if an action 
is morally wrong there must be some reason not to perform it. If it were 
true that an action’s being wrong guaranteed a reason not to perform it, 
then the truth of REASONS would indeed entail the truth of 
WRONGNESS.  
This proposed explanation is supported by the apparent fact that when 
people come to accept that the wrongness of an action does not entail the 
existence of some reason not to perform it, they tend no longer to find 
WRONGNESS so intuitive. It is, ultimately, I think, just the truth of 
REASONS that so many of us are, on reflection, so keen to insist upon. 
 
V. THE SECOND-BEST SOLUTION 
 
I’ve been arguing that DCS is the right solution to the non-identity 
problem. But there is a different possible solution that seems to me to have 
almost as much to recommend it. On some days, I am tempted to think 
that it (rather than DCS) is the correct solution. 
A good way to bring out the basic idea of this second-best solution is to 
return to a classic paper by Thomas Hill Jr.. In this paper, Hill considers 
some other kinds of cases (that is, not non-identity cases) where certain 
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actions seem morally wrong even though they are not worse for anyone.27 
He asks us to consider, for example: 
 
The Asphalter. A wealthy eccentric bought a house…surrounded by a beautiful 
display of grass, plants, and flowers, and…shaded by a huge old avocado tree. But 
the grass required cutting, the flowers needed tending, and the man wanted more 
sun. So he cut the whole lot down and covered the yard with asphalt. After all it 
was his property and he was not fond of plants.28 
 
Suppose the house was tucked away so that no passersby were made 
worse off as a result of no longer getting to see the garden. Suppose 
further that The Asphalter cut down the garden only on this condition—
he might even have been a kind of effective altruist, determined not to 
make others worse off. Still, many of us report having a negative moral 
reaction to what he has done. According to Hill, our concern here is not 
necessarily with his action itself—which, Hill says, might not be morally 
wrong, given that it in fact does not harm anyone. Instead, it might be just 
with his character, and his moral character at that. Hill writes: 
 
Rather than argue directly with destroyers of the environment who say, “Show 
me why what I am doing is immoral,” I want to ask, “What sort of person would 
want to do what they propose?” The point is not to skirt the issue with an ad 
hominem, but to raise a different moral question, for even if there is no convincing 
way to show that the destructive acts are wrong (independently of human and 
animal use and enjoyment), we may find that the willingness to indulge in them 




Sometimes we may not regard an act wrong at all though we see it as reflecting 
something objectionable about the person who does it. Imagine, for example, one 
who laughs spontaneously to himself when he reads a newspaper account of a 
plane crash that kills hundreds. Or, again, consider an obsequious grandson who, 
having waited for his grandmother’s inheritance with mock devotion, then 
secretly spits on her grave when at last she dies. Spitting on the grave may have 
no adverse consequences and perhaps it violates no rights. The moral uneasiness 
which it arouses is explained more by our view of the agent than by any 
conviction that what he did was immoral. Had he hesitated and asked, “Why 
shouldn’t I spit on her grave?”, it seems more fitting to ask him to reflect on the 
 
27 Thomas E. Hill, Jr. “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural 
Environments,” Environmental Ethics, V, 3 (1983): 211-24. 
28 Hill, ibid., 213. 
29 Hill, ibid., 217. My emphasis. 
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sort of person he is than to try to offer reasons why he should refrain from 
spitting.30 
 
A similar line can be mounted, I believe, and with considerable 
plausibility, in response to non-identity cases. We can say that our 
negative moral response in such cases is one, not to the actions of these 
agents, but strictly to their character. Their actions, we can say, are not 
morally wrong at all. It is only that those who performed them are 
morally dubious in certain ways. How are they morally dubious? In the 
ways, say, I’ve outlined earlier in this paper.31 
Now, of course, I am hardly the first to see that it might be an option to 
deny  that the actions of these agents are morally wrong. This response 
already has some important advocates—most notably, Boonin himself, as 
well as David Heyd.32 But the particular solution I’m suggesting as the 
second-best solution has a distinct advantage over the accounts of Boonin 
and Heyd, for it makes possible a better explanation of why we might be 
tempted to think that the actions in the non-identity cases are morally 
wrong, even though they are not wrong. On my proposed second-best 
solution, unlike on the accounts of Boonin and Heyd, we can say that we 
are picking up here on the morally dubious character of these people, and 
this is leading us to mistakenly infer or insist upon the moral wrongness 
of their actions. 
Finally, I want to say a few words about how my proposed second-best 
solution compares with DCS. Ultimately, I find DCS more compelling 
because I find it highly intuitive that in non-identity cases, it is not only 
the agents’ character that is morally dubious, but their actions as well. The 
ability of DCS to vindicate this judgment seems to me a considerable 
advantage of it. 
 
30 Hill, ibid., 218. 
31 Hill might give a different explanation of these ways, but I will not speculate on 
what he would say here. 
32 Boonin, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People, op. cit.; David Heyd, 
“Procreation and Value: Can Ethics Deal with Futurity Problems?,” Philosophia, XVIII, 
2-3 (1988): 151–70. 
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But perhaps the right thing to say is that the choice between DCS and 
my proposed second-best solution is really immaterial. The crucial thing 
to emphasise in responding to non-identity cases is that  
 
(1) our fundamental negative moral reaction here is to the character of 
these agents, and 
(2) we can account for these agents’ having morally dubious character 
traits (ones that their actions might reflect or express) even if these 
actions are not worse for anyone.  
 
Whether we should go from here to morally condemning the actions 




In this paper, I have argued that the actions in non-identity cases are 
morally wrong just when and because they result from, or reflect in those 
who have performed them, a morally dubious character trait. How can 
they result from a morally dubious character trait if they are not worse for 
anyone? It is because the relevant agents might (i) mistakenly believe that 
their actions would harm some future people (in one or more of the ways 
described above), (ii) fail to have adequately considered whether their 
actions would harm some future people, or (iii) be cold or imprudent in 
ways that might spread to others. 
